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ABSTRACT 
We estimate a model of the black market premium for dollars in 
Yugoslavia from 1974 to 1987. Unlike previous applications of the model, 
our analysis addresses non-stationarity in the underlying data by allowing 
for trend breaks. Endogenous structural break tests indicate the presence 
of breaks closely associated with the death of Tito and changes in laws 
affecting the operation of the black market. After accounting for these 
breaks, we find strong support for the underlying model. In addition, we 
find evidence consistent with the era of increased government involvement 
in the black market leading to greater volatility of the premium following 
regime change. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper applies the model of Dornbusch et al. 
(1983) to the black market for dollars in 
Yugoslavia from 1974 to 1987. The model predicts 
that the level of the black market premium – the 
percentage excess of the black market price of 
dollars over the official exchange rate set by the 
monetary authority – is affected by the official real 
exchange rate, depreciation-adjusted interest rate 
differentials, and seasonal factors associated with 
tourism and import/export smuggling in a country 
with an inconvertible currency and an officially 
determined exchange rate. While existing empirical 
studies generally lend support to the model, our 
application to Yugoslavia involves an empirical 
approach not previously considered in the literature. 
Specifically, we address non-stationarity in the 
levels of the variables by allowing for structural 
changes in the black market exchange rate model.1 
The Yugoslav example provides an interesting 
demonstration of this approach because regime 
change associated with the death of Tito in 1980 is 
followed shortly thereafter by legal changes relating 
to the operation of the black market and an era of 
considerable government intervention in the black 
market, all of which are potential sources of 
structural change. This setting also allows us to 
address the impact of government involvement in 
the black market – in particular, in explaining the 
marked increase in the volatility of the black 
market premium during the early 1980s.2 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II 
provides a brief account of black market activities 
in Yugoslavia. Section III describes the model and 
the time series properties of the underlying data. 
Section IV estimates the model and discusses the 
results. Section V discusses the volatility of the black 
market premium, and Section VI concludes. The 
Appendix provides a review of the trend break tests 
used in the analysis. 
 
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BLACK MARKET 
IN YUGOSLAVIA 
 
Black market activity in Yugoslavia has persisted 
since the dinar was issued in 1931. The government 
tolerated the black market as long as residents 
obtained only medium-sized amounts of foreign 
currency for travel. However, the regime frowned 
upon large transfers of flight capital through the 
black market by syndicates and import/export 
smugglers. Numerous edicts regulated import and 
export operations. Although technically illegal, the 
black market was readily accessible to Yugoslavs and 
it functioned openly for years as a parallel operation 
to the government monetary authority. 
 
In 1982, just two years after the death of Tito, 
Yugoslavia began a long scramble for foreign 
exchange primarily to pay off loans to the IMF and 
Western creditors. The nation was starved for foreign 
exchange. In May 1982, a new law empowered the 
state with the right to take 75% of hard currency 
exchange held by any enterprise, including private 
citizens. Following a 16.7% downgrade of the dinar 
in October 1982, the spreading black market received 
governmental attention. Stiff fines were imposed on 
residents dealing in the currency black market. 
Foreign tourists were given dinar-denominated 
cheques instead of dinar banknotes upon conversion 
of hard currency. As late as 1986, the government 
announced a new Law of Foreign Exchange 
Operations that allowed considerable government 
regulation of the black market.3 
 
In summary, three important dates to remember 
for our discussion of trend breaks in the next section 
are: (1) the May 1980 death of Tito; (2) the May 1982 
law empowering state activity in the black market; 
and (3) the 1986 Law of Foreign Exchange 
Operations. 
 
 
III. MODEL AND DATA 
 
The model 
 
The Dornbusch et al. (1983) model of the black 
market premium suggests the following regression 
equation: 
 
 (1) 
 
where PREM is the black market premium, RX is 
the official real (dinar/dollar) exchange rate, DI is the 
depreciation-adjusted interest differential between 
the dollar and dinar, MONTH=[FEB, . . . ,DEC] 
is a vector of monthly dummy variables (January 
is omitted because a constant is included), 
b=[b3, . . . , b13], and u is a normally and independently 
distributed error term. The model suggests that 
the premium on black market dollars is negatively 
related to the official real exchange rate. This is 
because a real depreciation in the official exchange 
rate will lead to an increase in dollar inflows 
(an increase in the supply of black market dollars) 
and put downward pressure on the premium.4 
Alternatively, the premium is positively related to 
the depreciation-adjusted interest differential, since a 
rise in the interest differential caused, say, by an 
increase in the nominal rate of interest on dollars, 
puts upward pressure on the premium, as dollars are 
now relatively more attractive and will cost more in 
terms of dinars. Thus, the expectation is that b1<0 
and b2>0 in Equation 1. 
 
An important source of net inflow of dollars into 
the black market in Yugoslavia was due to tourism, 
especially in the summer months along the Adriatic 
coast from Split to Dubrovnik. These months 
produced a seasonally high rate of dollar inflow 
into the black market giving rise to a seasonal 
accumulation of dollars and a seasonal decline in 
the premium. Accordingly, it is expected that the 
monthly dummies will capture the seasonal evolution 
in the premium that resembles this pattern. 
 
 
The data 
 
Monthly data on Yugoslavia’s black market 
exchange rate are taken from World Currency 
Yearbook (International Currency Analysis, Inc., 
Various). Other data are from the International 
Financial Statistics. The end-of-month nominal 
dinar–dollar exchange rate is used as the official 
exchange rate. The black market premium, PREM, 
is the percentage excess of the black market rate over 
the official rate. The official rate is multiplied by the 
ratio of the US producer price index to the Yugoslav 
producer price index to calculate the official real 
exchange rate, RX. Short-term (three-month) nominal 
interest rates are used to calculate the depreciation- 
adjusted interest differential, DI, which is 
defined as iUSþd_iYugo, where iUS and iYugo are 
nominal monthly interest rates on dollars and dinars, 
respectively, and d is the rate of depreciation of the 
dinar in the black market. 
 
The sample period for the analysis is 1974 to 1987. 
We choose to end our sample in 1987, just prior to the 
disintegration of the federal republic and subsequent 
period of hyperinflation, because the DI series begins 
to display extreme outliers as early as 1988. 
Furthermore, some of the newly formed states 
which emerged following the fall of Yugoslavia 
introduced their own currencies in the early 1990s, 
as the dinar entered a period of frequent devaluations. 
Since existing endogenous structural break unit 
root tests can identify at most two breaks, including 
a period as volatile as the post-1987 period in our 
sample would detract from the ability of these tests to 
identify the regime and legal changes of the early 
1980s, which is the focus of this paper. 
 
Figures 1–3 show the variables PREM, RX and DI, 
respectively. Visual inspection of these plots suggests 
that all three variables are likely to be non-stationary, 
and that structural changes occur in both the level 
and volatility of these variables sometime after the 
early 1980s. Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests indicate 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be 
rejected for each of the three series.5 Table 1 also 
suggests a change in behaviour in the early 1980s, 
as the mean and standard deviation of each series is 
noticeably different before and after this period.6 
 
 
Evidence on trend breaks in the data 
 
As noted above, conventional Dickey–Fuller tests 
imply that each of the series shown in Figs 1–3 are 
non-stationary processes. Recent developments in the 
time series econometrics literature suggest, however, 
that these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root too often when the true data-generating 
process is in fact trend stationary around a permanent 
break in the intercept and/or slope of the trend 
function. Thus, the structural change which was 
suggested in the discussion of Table 1 may be related 
to the finding that these series are non-stationary 
using conventional unit root tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional evidence on the presence of trend 
breaks in the data can be obtained by applying 
formal tests of structural change to the series PREM, 
RX and DI. We use the two-break ‘minimum LM’ 
test proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003).7 The 
results are summarized in Table 2. For all three series, 
the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favour 
of the trend break stationary alternative. Thus, in 
using these series to estimate the model in Equation 1, 
de-trending is appropriate to render the series 
stationary. The estimated trends for the PREM, 
RX and DI series are shown in Figs. 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively, along with the original series. 
 
It is interesting to note that breaks are found in 
each of the series during the early 1980s, with several 
of the estimated break dates coinciding with the 
actual dates of important regime or legal changes in 
Yugoslavia. For example, the first identified break in 
the RX series is May 1980, coinciding with the date of 
Tito’s death. Similarly, the two breaks in the PREM 
series are estimated to be May 1982 and June 1986, 
corresponding to the dates of important laws affecting 
black market activity (as discussed in Section II). 
Thus, the empirical results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that regime change caused structural 
changes in these series.8 
 
 
IV. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
We now turn to the estimation of the Dornbusch 
et al. (1983) model of the black market premium 
given by Equation 1. As is well known in the 
econometrics literature, it is, in general, not appropriate 
to estimate a regression model using variables 
that are non-stationary. Following the discussion in 
the previous section, we utilize the identified breaks 
to de-trend the PREM, RX and DI series and render 
them stationary.9 We denote the resulting de-trended 
stationary series as PREMdet, RXdet and DIdet, 
respectively.10 Thus, the model to be estimated is: 
 
 (2) 
 
Equation 2 is estimated using OLS with a lagged AR 
error structure (with the optimal lag length determined 
using the ‘general to specific’ method described 
above starting with a maximum of 24 lags) to correct 
for serial correlation. White’s robust standard errors 
are utilized to correct for possible heteroskedasticity 
in the error terms. 
 
 
 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results from the 
estimation of Equation 2 using OLS. Both the real 
exchange rate and the interest differential have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant. A real 
depreciation (or increase in RX) leads to a decline in 
the black market premium. An increase in US interest 
rates relative to those in Yugoslavia, adjusted for 
official depreciation, leads to an increase in the black 
market premium. The equation explains a substantial 
part of the variation in the premium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of seasonal factors is assessed with the 
monthly dummies included in the estimation of 
Equation 2. The constant term shows a premium of 
1.46% for the base month of January. The estimated 
coefficients for the other months indicate the amount 
by which the premium in that month exceeds the 
average for January. The monthly dummies yield the 
expected pattern of seasonal variation over the year. 
The tourist season, which peaks during the summer 
months, is shown by a seasonal decline of the 
premium during the months of May through July. 
The premium during these months is found to be 
statistically significantly below the January average, 
with the seasonal peak occurring in June with a 
decline of nearly 6% from the January level. An 
F-test reveals that, as a group, the monthly seasonal 
dummies are significantly different from zero at the 
1% level.11 
 
 
V. VARIABILITY IN THE BLACK MARKET PREMIUM 
 
Visual inspection of Fig. 1 suggests a structural change 
in the behaviour of the black market premium in the 
early 1980s. Indeed, the formal trend break tests of the 
previous section indicate a structural break in May 
1982, just two years after the death of Tito and 
coincident with legal changes increasing government 
involvement in the black market. The downward trend 
in the premium following the May 1982 break (as 
shown in Fig. 1) is consistent with a period of increased 
government intervention in the black market in the 
early 1980s. Specifically, the government crack-down 
on black market activities (which begins with the May 
1982 legal changes) to come up with hard currency in 
the treasury gives rise to an accumulation of dollars 
and a decline in the premium. 
 
The black market premium also exhibits an 
increase in volatility during the early 1980s. While 
this aspect of structural change is not captured by the 
trend break tests of the previous section, an increase 
in the volatility of the premium is also consistent with 
an era of increased government involvement in black 
market activities. Recall from Section II the history of 
black market activities in Yugoslavia which ends with 
a period of increased government involvement. 
Phylaktis (1992) investigates the effects of government- 
imposed foreign exchange restrictions on the 
black market premium in Chile, finding that such 
restrictions are important determinants of the black 
market premium. Since detailed quantitative data on 
government restrictions are not available for the 
Yugoslav experience, the following analysis suggests 
an alternative approach based on trend break 
evidence combined with knowledge of the timing of 
regime change and important legal changes affecting 
black market activity. 
In the remainder of this section, we consider a 
model of the black market in Yugoslavia which 
allows an explicit specification of the conditional 
variance, or volatility, of the black market premium. 
Bollerslev (1986) introduced the class of generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) models, where the variance of the 
dependent variable is modelled as a function of past 
values of the dependent variable and independent, or 
exogenous, variables. In particular, we estimate the 
following standard GARCH(p, q) specification: 
 
 (3) 
 
 (4) 
 
where s2t 
is the one-period ahead forecast variance 
based on past information, also known as the 
conditional variance. We will refer to ai, i=1, . . . , p, 
as the ARCH(i) term, and cj, j=1, . . . , q, as the 
GARCH(j) term. The vector x is a set of predetermined, 
or exogenous, regressors in the variance 
Equation 4. Note that the mean Equation 3 is the 
same model estimated earlier in Equation 2. 
 
The results from estimating the model in Equations 
3 and 4 are reported in column 2 of Table 3. A set 
of monthly dummies is included (in x) to assess the 
influence of seasonal factors in the volatility of the 
black market premium. Also in x, we include a 
dummy variable, denoted D(1982:05), which equals 
one beginning in May 1982 to test the hypothesis that 
an increase in volatility was associated with regime 
change during the early 1980s.12 The use of the 
GARCH model leaves the estimated coefficients on 
the real exchange rate, interest differential and 
seasonal factors in the mean equation unaffected. 
The estimate of the variance equation is obtained 
using a GARCH (3, 3) model, although the estimated 
ARCH and GARCH coefficients are not reported to 
conserve space.13 The estimate of the variance 
equation suggests an important seasonal effect on 
the volatility of the black market premium, as several 
of the monthly dummies are statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level. As a group, the monthly 
seasonal dummies are significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
The regime change dummy, D(1982:05), is also 
significant at the 1% level, and the estimated 
coefficient suggests an increase in the volatility of 
the black market premium beginning in the early 
1980s. The estimated conditional standard deviation 
of the premium is shown in Fig. 4. The figure shows 
the apparent seasonal aspect of the volatility, and 
also indicates an increase in the mean level of 
volatility beginning in the early 1980s. More formal 
evidence on the increase in volatility is obtained by 
performing a one-break version of the Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) trend break test on the estimated 
conditional standard deviation series depicted in 
Fig. 4 (see Lee and Strazicich, 2004 for details). 
The results indicate a statistically significant break 
in November 1982, shortly after the May 1982 
adoption of the new law empowering state activity 
in the black market (recall the discussion in 
Section II). The estimated trend of the conditional 
standard deviation series is shown in Fig. 4 along 
with the original series. Casual inspection suggests 
an increase of approximately 33% in the mean 
level of volatility associated with the November 
1982 break. 
 
Such an increase in volatility suggests an important 
risk perceived by speculators that makes dinars 
and dollars less perfect substitutes. This behaviour 
during the early 1980s is consistent with an era of 
increased government involvement in the black 
market following the death of Tito. Thus, the 
evidence supports the hypothesis that increased 
government involvement in the black market 
increased the volatility of the premium, just as the 
underlying model suggests. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
We apply the Dornbusch et al. (1983) model of the 
black market premium to the black market for dollars 
in Yugoslavia over the period 1974–1987. We first 
apply tests of structural change to address the nonstationarity 
of the variables in the model, an 
approach not considered in previous applications of 
the model. Our finding is that all of the variables 
are trend break stationary, with estimated break 
dates closely associated with regime change and legal 
changes following the death of Tito in the early 1980s. 
We use this information to de-trend the variables 
before estimating the model. Once the variables are 
rendered stationary, we find strong support for the 
underlying model, including an important seasonal 
component associated with the summer tourist season 
in Yugoslavia. 
 
We extend our analysis to explain the increase in 
volatility that is observed in the black market 
premium during the early 1980s. Using a standard 
GARCH specification, we find evidence of a significant 
seasonal component in the volatility of the 
black market premium. In addition, the evidence 
suggests a significant increase in the volatility of the 
premium during the early 1980s. This increase 
coincides with the beginning of an era of increased 
government involvement in black market activities in 
Yugoslavia, suggesting that government involvement 
reduced the substitutability between the official and 
black market currencies. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Applications of the Dornbusch et al. model include Phylaktis (1992), Shachmurove (1999) 
and Bahmani-Oskooee and Goswami (2005), among others. These studies and many others do 
not address the issue of potential non-stationarity. Other studies use a cointegration approach 
to address non-stationarity in the data. See, for example, Moore and Phylaktis (2000) 
and Diamandis and Drakos (2005). No studies that we are aware of allow for the possibility of 
structural changes in the model. 
 
2. Shachmurove (1999) includes Yugoslavia in a study of the black market premium in a panel 
of developing countries. However, the time dimension of the study is 1985–1989, which is too 
late to allow any consideration of the issues noted here. 
 
3. For a complete discussion of the evolution of government intervention in the black market in 
Yugoslavia, see World Currency Yearbook (International Currency Analysis, Inc., Various) and 
Shaplen (1984). 
 
4. An increase in RX denotes a real depreciation. 
 
5. Results for these tests are available upon request from the authors. 
 
6. The ‘break date’ used to construct Table 1 is October 1982, based only on casual observation 
of the PREM series. 
 
7. A description of trend break tests, in general, and the Lee and Strazicich (2003) test, in 
particular, is provided in the Appendix. 
 
8. Other commonly used one-break endogenous unit root tests, such as those proposed by 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Vogelsang and Perron (1998), also suggest breaks in the early 
1980s for the PREM and DI series, but not the RX series. See the discussion in the Appendix 
for the advantages of the two break minimum LM test in the present application. 
 
9. Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% level in each 
of the de-trended series. 
 
 
 
11. Shachmurove (1999) was unable to find evidence of seasonal variation in a panel of 
developing countries. 
 
12. May 1982 is the first estimated break date in the premium series obtained in the analysis of 
Table 2. 
13. The chosen order (p, q) of the GARCH model reported in Table 3 is determined in a manner 
similar to the ‘general to specific’ method discussed previously, starting with a GARCH(9,9) 
model. Lagged AR terms are included in the mean equation, Equation 3, to correct for serial 
correlation, with the chosen number of lags determined by the ‘general to specific’ method  
tarting with a maximum of 24 lags. The particular model reported in Table 3 is an illustration of 
the kind of results obtained using such a model. The results are qualitatively similar using other 
specifications of the general model. 
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APPENDIX: REVIEW OF FORMAL TESTS FOR 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
 
Perron (1989) proposed the following methodology 
for testing the unit root null hypothesis against the 
trend break stationary alternative: (1) specify the 
location of the break date (TB); (2) estimate a 
regression that nests the random walk null and the 
trend break stationary alternative with either a 
change in intercept (Model A), a break in slope 
(Model B), or both (Model C); and (3) use the 
t-statistic on the first lag of the dependent variable to 
carry out the test of the null hypothesis. This type of 
test is often referred to as an ‘exogenous’ break unit 
root test since the break date must be specified 
a priori. 
 
Christiano (1992), among others, criticizes the 
assumption that the location of the break is known 
a priori in Perron’s methodology. Christiano shows 
that if the break date is not known and the researcher 
determines the location of the break by visually 
inspecting the data, the unit root null will be rejected 
too often. This criticism gave rise to an extension 
of Perron’s methodology which does not require prespecification 
of the break date. The strategy applies 
Perron’s methodology for each possible break date in 
the sample, yielding a sequence of t-statistics. From 
this sequence, various algorithms can be used to 
construct ‘minimum-t-statistics’ which maximize 
evidence against the null hypothesis. One example is 
to use the minimum of the sequence of t-statistics as 
proposed by Zivot and Andrews (1992). As such, the 
Zivot and Andrews test determines the break point 
where the unit root test statistic is the most negative 
and, therefore, the least favourable to the null 
hypothesis.14 
 
A potential problem with these augmented Dickey– 
Fuller type endogenous break unit root tests is that 
they derive their critical values assuming no break 
under the null hypothesis. Nunes et al. (1997) and 
Lee and Strazicich (2001) provide evidence that 
assuming no break under the null causes the test 
statistic to diverge and leads to too many rejections of 
the unit root null when the true data-generating 
process is a unit root with break(s). To prevent such 
‘spurious rejections’, Lee and Strazicich (2003) 
propose an endogenous two-break unit root test. 
This two-break ‘minimum LM’ unit root test does 
not diverge in the presence of breaks under the null 
hypothesis, so that rejection of the null unambiguously 
implies trend break stationarity. 
 
We use the methodology of Lee and Strazicich 
(2003) to test for structural breaks in the series 
PREM, RX and DI. It seems particularly appropriate 
to use a test that includes the possibility of breaks 
under the null hypothesis given our prior knowledge 
of regime change (and, thus, the possibility of 
structural breaks) in the underlying data. The two-break 
‘minimum LM’ unit root test statistic can be 
estimated by regression according to the LM (score) 
principle as follows: 
 
 
 
To determine the value of k, the number of 
ΔSt-i terms needed to correct for serial correlation, 
we use the following ‘general to specific’ method. 
At each combination of break points λ=( λ 1, λ 2)' in 
the time interval [0.1T, 0.9T ] (to eliminate endpoints), 
we begin with a maximum of 24 lags of 
ΔS and examine the statistical significance of the 
last term. If the last term is not significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level (using the 
asymptotic normal distribution), the last lagged 
term is dropped and the model re-estimated with 
k=23 lags, and so on until either the last term is 
significant or k=0. This procedure has been shown 
to perform well relative to other data-dependent 
procedures; see Ng and Perron (1995). As such, 
we jointly determine the location of breaks and the 
number of lagged ΔS terms endogenously from 
the data.15 
 
 
